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In this article it is argued that evolutionary plausibility must be made an 
important constraining factor when building theories of language. Recent 
suggestions that presume that language is necessarily a perfect or optimal 
system are at odds with this position, evolutionary theory showing us that 
evolution is a meliorizing agent often producing imperfect solutions. 
Perfection of the linguistic system is something that must be demonstrated, 
rather than presumed. Empirically, examples of imperfection are found not 
only in nature and in human cognition, but also in language — in the form 
of ambiguity, redundancy, irregularity, movement, locality conditions, and 
extra-grammatical idioms. Here it is argued that language is neither perfect 
nor optimal, and shown how theories of language which place these proper-
ties at their core run into both conceptual and empirical problems.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Linguistic theory is inevitably underdetermined by data. Whether one is trying to 
characterize the distribution of wh-questions across languages or account for the 
relation between active sentences and passive sentences, there are often many 
distinct accounts, and linguistic data alone is rarely absolutely decisive. For this 
reason, theorists often appeal to external considerations, such as learnability 
criteria (Gold 1967, Wexler & Culicover 1980), psycholinguistic data (Schönefeld 
2001), and facts about the nature and time course of language acquisition (e.g., 
the accounts presented in Ritchie & Bhatia 1998). There is also a move afoot to 
constrain linguistic theory by appeal to considerations of neurological plausi-
bility (Hickok & Poeppel 2004, Marcus, in press). And there is a long-standing 
history of constraining linguistic theory by appealing to considerations of cross-
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linguistic variation (Greenberg 1963, Chomsky 1981a, Baker 2002). Here, we 
consider a different sort of potential biological constraint on the nature of 
linguistic theory: Evolvability.  
 Constructing a theory which says that language is evolvable involves 
looking at what we know from evolutionary biology about what typically 
evolving systems look like, what kinds of properties they have, and then 
applying this to questions about the plausible nature of language. Here, our focus 
will be on the plausibility of recent suggestions (e.g., Chomsky 1998, 2002a, 
2002b, Roberts 2000, Lasnik 2002, Piattelli–Palmarini & Uriagereka 2004, Boeckx 
2006) that language may be an ‘optimal’ or near-optimal solution to mapping 
between sound and meaning — a premise that has significant impact on recent 
developments in linguistic theory. 
 In what follows, we will argue that the presumption that language1 is 
optimal or near-optimal is biologically implausible, and at odds with several 
streams of empirical data. We begin with some background in evolutionary 
theory.  
  
 
2. Evolution, Optimality, and Imperfection 
 
Our analysis begins with a simple observation: Although evolution sometimes 
yields spectacular results, it also sometimes produces remarkably inefficient or 
inelegant systems. Whereas the Darwinian phrase (actually due to Huxley rather 
than Darwin) of “survival of the fittest” sometimes is misunderstood as implying 
that perfection or optimality is the inevitable product of evolution; in reality, 
evolution is a blind process, with absolutely no guarantee of perfection.  
To appreciate why this is the case, it helps to think of natural selection in terms of 
a common metaphor: as a process of hill-climbing. A fitness landscape symbol-
izes the space of possible phenotypes that could emerge in the organism. Peaks in 
the landscape stand for phenotypes with higher fitness, troughs represent 
phenotypes with lower fitness. Evolution is then understood as the process of 
traversing the landscape. Our focus in the current article is on a limitation in that 
hill-climbing process, and on how that limitation reflects back upon a prominent 
strand of linguistic theorizing. The limitation is this: Because evolution is a blind 
process (Dawkins 1986), it is vulnerable to what engineers call the problem of 
local maxima. A local maximum is a peak that is higher than any of its immediate 
neighbors, but still lower (possibly considerably lower) than the highest point in 
the landscape. 
 In the popular “fitness landscape” terminology of Sewall Wright (1932), the 
perfect solution and the optimal solution to a given problem posed by the 
                                            
    1 The term ‘language’ itself is of course intrinsically ambiguous; the term can, among other 
things, refer to the expressions in a particular language, to the underlying cognitive system 
itself, to its biological and neurological manifestation, or to a formal model of the system. 
Here, our discussion pertains primarily to the latter (although the former two will be 
mentioned from time to time); that is, what is often referred to as the human language 
faculty, which is formally modeled, as a grammar, in different ways by different linguistic 
theories. 
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organism’s environment can (and often do) differ in their location. While 
perfection holds only of the highest peak, lower peaks in the landscape may in 
some circumstances be optimal. But, in the words of Simon (1984), natural 
selection does not even necessarily seek optimality. Rather, evolution essentially 
serves as it were a satisficing agent; rather than inevitably converging on the best 
solution in some particular circumstance, it may converge on some other 
reasonable if less than optimal solution to the problem at hand.  
 Perhaps the most accurate phraseology is that of Dawkins (1982) who uses 
the term ‘meliorizing’, which captures the fact that evolution is constantly testing 
for improvements in the system, but not explicitly guided to any particular target 
and by no means guaranteed to converge on perfection or even optimality. 
Perfection is possible, but not something that can be presumed. 
 
2.1. Imperfections in Nature 
 
In the real world, evolution sometimes achieves perfection or near-optimality, as 
in the efficiency of locomotion (Bejan & Marden 2006), but has in many instances 
fallen short of any reasonable ideal. The mammalian recurrent laryngeal nerve, 
for example, is remarkably inelegant and inefficient, following a needlessly 
circuitous route from brain to larynx posterior to the aorta. While in humans, this 
may not add up to a significant amount of extra nerve material, in giraffes it is 
estimated to be almost twenty feet (Smith 2001). The problem here is one of what 
Marcus (2008) calls evolutionary inertia — the tendency of evolution to build 
new systems through small modifications of older systems, even when a fresh 
redesign might have worked better. 
 The human spine is similarly badly designed (Krogman 1951, Marcus 
2008). Its job is to support the load of an upright bipedal animal, yet a much 
better solution to this problem would be to distribute our weight across a 
number of columns, rather than let a single column carry it all. As a result of the 
spine’s less than perfect design, back pain is common in our species. Here again, 
evolutionary inertia is the culprit — the human spine inherits its architecture, 
with minor modification, from our quadrupedal ancestors, even though a single 
column works better in bearing horizontal loads than it does in bearing vertical 
loads. Although a sensible engineer could have anticipated the ensuing 
problems, the blind process of evolution could not.  
 Another illustration of the friction that derives from evolutionary inertia is 
the human appendix, an example of what is known as a vestige. This is a 
different type of imperfection, an example of a structure that has no current place 
in the organism at all. Its existence does not seem to increase our fitness in any 
way, and its poor structure can lead to blockages which cause sometimes fatal 
infection (Theobald 2003). The appendix was an earlier adaptation for digestion 
of plants in our ancestors, now not required by non-herbivorous humans. 
Although we might have been better off without an appendix and the ensuing 
risk of infection, evolution lacks the capacity to anticipate; because of the 
architecture of evolutionary inertia we are stuck with the risks despite a lack of 
corresponding benefits. (Yet another example comes from human wisdom teeth, 
which are imperfect due to the problem of fit that our larger third molars pose for 
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our modern jaws. Our ancestors had larger jaws that comfortably accommodated 
the larger wisdom teeth, but cumulative gradual adaptive evolution has 
decreased our jaw size over time, resulting in pain on eruption, and impacting of 
the wisdom teeth.) 
 
2.2. Imperfections in Human Cognition 
 
In human cognition too, imperfection arising from gradual adaptive evolutionary 
processes seems common. Human memory, for instance, is far from perfect 
(Marcus 2008). It can be easily distorted by environmental factors, and we often 
blur together memories of similar events, remembering the general but not the 
specific. For example, we may remember some fact we read, but not where we 
read it. Furthermore, our memories can be tested, and often distorted in stressful 
circumstances, such as under the questioning in a courtroom. Marcus argues that 
location-addressable memory, such as computers have, would be much more 
useful to modern humans, but we are the result of gradual cumulative evolution 
from ancestors who dealt in the here-and-now, where context-dependent 
memory was a good enough tool. Once more, evolution did not have the 
foresight to bestow on us the kind of memory that would be a better solution to 
problems faced by modern humans. 
 Human belief too, shows evidence of imperfect design (Marcus 2008). Our 
beliefs are also subject to biasing or warping. Although we may believe that we 
reason objectively, this is often not the case. Context, emotion, and unconscious 
biases, such as what we are familiar with, or the confirmation bias, can all warp 
our beliefs. Again, this imperfection is the result of cumulative evolution from an 
ancestor that needed to act, but not often to think or reason, evolution once again 
lacking the foresight required to know that reasoning objectively and logically 
would be more useful to us. 
 
 
3. Is Language Different? 
 
If all this is taken for granted in biology, it is not taken for granted in linguistics. 
To the contrary, in recent years it has become popular to assume that language 
may well be perfect, or nearly so. Chomsky (2002a: 93) has argued that “language 
design may really be optimal in some respects, approaching a ‘perfect solution’ to 
minimal design specifications”; similarly, Roberts (2000), for example, has argued 
that language may be a computationally perfect system for creating mappings 
from signal to meaning. 
 Could language be different, more perfect than other aspects of biology? 
Since the balance of perfection and imperfection could vary between domains, 
we see this as a fundamentally empirical question. Since imperfection exists, it 
seems unreasonable to simply presume linguistic perfection, but near-perfection 
exists, too, as in the primate retina’s exquisite sensitivity to light (Baylor et al. 
1979). 
 That said, a priori it would be surprising if language were better designed 
than other systems, for the simple reason that language is, in evolutionary terms, 
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an extremely recent innovation. By most recent estimates, language emerged 
only within the last 100,000 years (Klein & Edgar 2002), and as such there has 
been relatively little time for debugging.  
 
3.1. Imperfections and Inefficiencies in Language: Some Empirical Evidence 
 
At least superficially, instances of imperfection seem plentiful in language, most 
notably in all manner of speech errors, such as the phonological slip in written a 
splendid support (instead of written a splendid report), the lexical slip in a fifty pound 
dog of bag food (instead of a fifty pound bag of dog food) (from Fromkin’s Speech 
Error Database), or the Spoonerism (attributed to Reverend Spooner himself) in 
You have hissed all the mystery lectures (instead of You have missed all the history 
lectures). According to the taxonomy of Dell (1995), there are at least 5 distinct 
types of speech error (exchanges, shifts, anticipations, perseverations and 
substitutions), which can apply at some 10 different linguistic levels (from 
sentence through word, morpheme, syllable and phoneme, to feature). 
Frequencies of occurrence are as high as 1–2 per thousand words.2 
 Similarly, people frequently misparse passives with non-canonical relations 
(e.g., reading man bites dog as if it were dog bites man, Ferreira 2003) and 
interpreting sentences in ways that are internally consistent. For example, 
subjects often infer from the garden-path sentence While Anna dressed the baby 
slept both that the baby slept (consistent with a proper parse) and that Anna 
dressed the baby (inconsistent with what one would expect to be the final parse, 
Christianson et al. 2001). Likewise, they are vulnerable to “linguistic illusions”, 
such as the belief that More people have been to Russia than I have is a well-formed 
sentence, when it is in fact not. 
 Still, such errors do not necessarily bear on more architectural questions 
about the nature of grammar, per se; they might be seen as purely a matter of 
performance. What of competence grammar? Here, too, we will suggest, rumors 
of linguistic perfection are exaggerated.  
  
3.1.1. Redundancy 
 
Turning to competence, and the core syntactic system, a first type of imperfection 
comes under the heading of redundancy. We will define redundancy as the 
ability of more than one structure or (sub-)system to carry out the same function. 
Redundancy therefore entails duplication or inefficiency in a system. A perfectly 
designed system would surely eschew what is not just clumsy, but may also be 
more costly, requiring instead a system that is streamlined and efficient.  
 Yet language is replete with redundancy, not just in the occasional genuine 
synonym (couch and sofa) but also in more subtle areas such as case marking. The 
language faculty makes available two possible manners of marking case on a 
noun — by imposing strict word order constraints, or with the use of inflectional 
                                            
    2 This measure holds for English, based on an analysis of the London–Lund corpus (Garnham 
et al. 1981), but there is no reason to think that it differs greatly cross-linguistically (Dell 
1995). 
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morphology. Languages like English mostly make use of the former strategy, and 
languages like Russian typically use the latter. Either would suffice, but from a 
sheer elegance perspective, it is somewhat surprising that human languages fail 
to adopt a consistent solution. Meanwhile, languages like German show that both 
strategies can be used concurrently — in a highly redundant fashion. In (1a), the 
inflectional morphology on subject and object differs. This contrasts with (1b), 
where the definite article for feminine nouns does not differ in form from 
nominative to accusative case: 
 
(1) a. Der    Hund  beisst  den  Mann.    German 
           the.NOM  dog  bites    the.ACC  man 
  ‘The dog bites the man.’ 
 b. Die    Katze   beisst  die  Frau.  
        the.NOM   cat       bites    the.ACC woman 
  ‘The cat bites the woman.’ 
 
While in (1b), only word order can signal case, in (1a) both inflectional 
morphology and word order signal case. We know here that word order is 
playing a part in (1a), and it is not simply the case that the morphology does all 
the signaling, because SVO is the default order in German main clauses, if the 
opposite order is used, as in (2), intonational differences show this as somehow 
marked. 
 
(2) Den   Mann   beisst der   Hund.       German 
 the.ACC man      bites  the.NOM dog 
 ‘The dog bites the man.’ 
 
 A second instance of redundancy is seen in person and number morpho-
logy. It is very often the case that a language will redundantly mark person and/ 
or number on more than one element in a phrase or sentence. In English, for 
example, we get cases like (3), where every single word in the sentence is marked 
in some way for plurality. 
 
(3) Those four people are teachers. 
 
What is remarkable about this is how easily in principle it could avoided: 
Mathematical and computer languages lack these sorts of redundancies alto-
gether. 
 Redundancy can of course be adaptive. It benefits humans to have two 
kidneys, and it benefits birds to have excess flight feathers (King & McLelland 
1984). In a similar way, synonyms might be argued to be adaptive due to the 
advantage they confer when retrieval of a particular lexical item fails. Or, it might 
be argued that in a noisy channel, redundantly specifying some parts of the code 
would lead to increased communicative success. Perhaps, then, examples like 
this should not be thought of as imperfections. However, the redundancies we in 
fact observe appear too arbitrary and unsystematic to be explained strictly in 
terms of their benefits towards communicating relative to noise in the communi-
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cation channel, especially in comparison to the more systematic techniques one 
finds in digital communication. The parity system, for example, that modems use 
– making the 8th bit a 1 (‘odd parity’) if the number of ‘1’s in the first seven bits is 
itself odd, otherwise zero — is systematically applied to every byte in a stream; 
redundancies in language are frequently far less systematic. Plurality is marked 
in some instances but not others, for example. Patterns of syncretism often keep 
redundancies themselves from being systematic. Furthermore, the existence in 
natural languages of redundancies that have no apparent advantage — where 
artificial languages lack them — undermines the case that language is maximally 
elegant or economical, and emphasizes the extent to which the details of 
grammar are often imperfect hotchpotches. 
 In fact, a case of the very opposite of what is here defined as redundancy 
gives us a further imperfection in language. If redundancy involves multiple 
structures carrying out the same function, the doubling or tripling of function 
that is seen in syncretic forms such as the past and passive participles in English, 
or nominative and vocative case morphology on certain classes of nouns in Latin 
(Baerman et al. 2005), leads to imperfection in the form of a lack of clarity. 
Differing functions being fulfilled by identical structures might be considered 
optimal or perfect under an interpretation appealing to efficiency or simplicity, 
yet taken to extremes the system that emerges is far from usable.  
 
3.1.2. Ambiguity 
 
Ambiguity, both lexical and syntactic, provides another type of imperfection 
present in natural language, but not in formal languages.3 Lexical ambiguity 
comes in the form of homonymy, for example, bear as an animal versus bear as a 
verb of carrying, and polysemy (which differs from homonymy in that the 
meanings of the multiple lexical items that sound alike are connected in some 
way), for example, mouth of a river, or of a person, wood as a part of a tree, or as 
an area where many trees are growing. In both cases, the signal on its own is not 
enough to pick out a meaning. The use of a lexically ambiguous word requires 
the listener to take the immediate context and his world knowledge into account 
in order to correctly assign a meaning to the speaker’s utterance, thus making the 
process inherently less efficient than it would be given a non-ambiguous system. 
 If the syntactic component of the grammar is understood as responsible for 
creating a mapping between signal and meaning, the most natural manner in 
which it would do this is to map a single unique signal to a single unique 
meaning. Syntactic ambiguities can be looked at as violations of this intuitively 
elegant system of one–to–one mapping.4 In syntactic ambiguities, single signals 
                                            
    3  One possible counterexample that has been suggested to us is the operator ‘=‘, which in 
some computer languages functions as both an assigner and a comparison operator. 
However, it is interesting to note both that this particular ambiguity in programming 
languages is parasitic on a lexical ambiguity in natural language, and that it has been readily 
resolved in many more modern programming languages, simply by assigning distinct 
operators to equals and assignment. 
    4  Following Higginbotham (1985), it is possible that ambiguities such as in (4) and (5) stem 
from sets of sentences that are effectively akin to homonyms, sounding alike but having 
distinct meanings. However, such an analysis does not eliminate the issue of ambiguity, it 
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are mapped to multiple meanings. In (4a), for example, the signal maps equally to 
two meanings, (i) where I use green binoculars to see the girl, and (ii) where I see 
the girl who has a pair of green binoculars. The signal in (4b) maps to four 
meanings, (i) where I stand on the mountain and use green binoculars to see the 
girl, (ii) where I use green binoculars to see the girl who comes from the 
mountain, (iii) where I stand on the mountain and see the girl who has a pair of 
green binoculars, and (iv) where I see the girl who is from the mountain who has 
a pair of green binoculars. In (5), syntactic ambiguity results from elision, 
mapping the signal to two possible meanings, (i) where John saw a friend of 
John’s and Bill also saw a friend of John’s, and (ii) where John saw a friend of 
John’s and Bill saw a friend of Bill’s.  
 
(4) a. I saw the girl with green binoculars. 
 b. I saw the girl with green binoculars from the mountain. 
 
(5) John saw a friend of his and Bill did too. 
  
 To be sure, ambiguity can be used by the speaker intentionally to create 
vagueness. For example, when, in the context of a job reference, I say I can’t 
recommend this person enough, I am being deliberately evasive. In addition, there 
are cases of syntactic ambiguities too that can be resolved by context. But even 
when both deliberate and immediately resolvable ambiguities are factored out, a 
considerable amount of unintended — yet in principle unnecessary — ambiguity 
remains (e.g., Keysar & Henley 2002).  
 
3.1.3. Irregularity 
 
Languages also deviate from elegance and simplicity in the widespread existence 
of linguistic irregularity, both lexical (morphological) and syntactic. If language 
were perfect, then we would expect that it should be fully regular and systematic, 
as all formal languages are. In natural language, mappings between sound and 
meaning are created in inconsistent, almost messy ways.  
 Morphological paradigms are the most obvious case of irregularity in 
language — the verbal paradigm for the verb to be in many languages, or the 
formation of plural nouns in English — but this imperfection can also be seen in 
other areas of the grammar. Syntactic irregularity is found in extra-grammatical 
idioms (Fillmore et al. 1988) like by and large, all of a sudden, and so far so good, 
where lexical items are combined in a way completely unpredictable by the 
grammar of the language in question. For example, there is no rule in the 
grammar of English that permits the conjunction of a preposition like by with an 
adjective like large. Nor is there any rule in the grammar of English that says two 
adjective phrases (so far, so good) can be concatenated. Such irregularity has no 
counterpart in synthetic languages, and forces the parser to do more work than is 
strictly necessary (e.g., in determining whether input strings are to be interpreted 
compositionally or idiomatically). 
                                                                                                                        
merely re-locates it, and still requires the listener to make mappings from surface strings to 
underlying meanings that are not one-to-one and not specified by the grammar. 
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3.1.4. Needless Complexity 
 
A fourth class of imperfection in language concerns intricacies that the linguistic 
system could function without. The first example of this type of needless 
complexity concerns the form and interpretation of sentences like (6): 
 
(6) Who did John meet? 
 
Here, the object of the meeting event is questioned by placing the lexical item who 
at the start of the sentence. However, we interpret who at the end of the sentence, 
as belonging after the verb meet. Linguistic theories which assume a derivational 
approach to language posit an operation in the grammar which permits elements 
to be displaced from one position to another. Chomsky (2002b) argues that 
movement is motivated by the need to distinguish between the deep semantics of 
argument structure and the surface semantics of discourse structure. So, who is an 
argument of meet, but the fact that (6) is a question is signaled by moving the wh-
word to the beginning. However, movement is not necessary here as this kind of 
distinction can be made in other ways. Intonation can mark surface semantics — 
in fact, English topic/comment and focus semantics are much more frequently 
marked intonationally than by syntactic movement. Another option is to use 
morphological markers, like Japanese wa. The cases here are specific, but the 
point can be generalized — if there exist languages that do not require movement 
to make the distinction between deep and surface semantics, then why does the 
language faculty need to make this operation available at all? In some eyes, 
movement may be a more elegant way of signaling this semantic distinction than, 
say stacks or special features, but a system lacking any of these is more elegant 
still.  
 Operations such as movement that are part of language competence are 
constrained by locality conditions. This means that it is not permissible to apply 
linguistic operations just anywhere, but that they are constrained to apply within 
limited structural domains. For example, (7a) is more acceptable than (7b) 
because the wh-phrase in the initial position of the sentence has moved a rela-
tively short step in (7a) (from after persuade), but in (7b) has moved a step longer 
than is permitted (from after visit). 
 
(7) a. Who did John persuade to visit who? 
  b.     *Who did John persuade who to visit? 
 
 These too are absent in formal languages and seem to add needless 
complexity. Locality conditions force the learner to execute extra computation in 
that he must figure out for his language where the boundaries that divide what is 
local from what is not lie. A linguistic system designed with efficiency and 
economy as its central concern would minimize the work the learner must 
undertake. The question then is why movement and constraints on locality exist. 
One possibility is that if our linguistic representations are subject to the 
limitations of the type of memory we have inherited from our ancestors (Marcus, 
in press) locality conditions allow us to process complex linguistic expressions in 
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the fragmented pieces we are capable of dealing with. What is an imperfection by 
the measure of efficiency and economy can be explained by our evolutionary 
history. Language is imperfect and messy because evolution is imperfect and 
messy. 
 
 
4. If Language Is Not Perfect, Might It Be Optimal? 
 
The examples presented in the previous section strongly suggest that, 
empirically, the human language faculty fails to meet the strict criterion of 
perfection, but they still leave open a weaker possibility. Could language be seen 
as some sort of optimal tradeoff? Although perfection and optimality are often 
conflated in discussions of this issue in the literature, the two notions are 
certainly conceptually distinct. Perfection entails an absolute, the best in all 
possible circumstances, while optimality entails points on a gradient scale, each 
of which can only be reached by overcoming some limitations, and thus is the 
best in some specific circumstances only. As Pinker & Jackendoff (2005: 27) note, 
“nothing is ‘perfect’ or ‘optimal’ across the board but only with respect to some 
desideratum”.  
 The immediate question, then, is: “Is there any criterion by which language 
could be considered to be optimal?” A number of criteria spring immediately to 
mind: ease of production, ease of comprehension, ease of acquisition, efficient 
brain storage, efficient communication, efficient information encoding, and 
minimization of energetic costs. Let us consider each in turn. 
 First, one could imagine that language might be optimal from the 
perspective of speakers, minimizing costs for producing expressions. In reality, 
however, this criterion is not always met. In cases of morphological redundancy, 
such as that seen in person and number morphology mentioned above, where 
the speaker has to produce this type of inflection on multiple (in some cases 
every) lexical items in one sentence, the computational costs for the speaker rise 
considerably. In question formation, the speaker is forced to calculate locality 
conditions to ensure a wh-phrase is not uttered in an illegitimate position in the 
sentence, again a case of increased computational load. 
 What of optimality from the opposite perspective? If production costs are 
higher than strictly necessary, is this because comprehension costs are kept low? 
Could language be optimal from the hearer’s perspective, allowing speakers’ 
utterances to be interpreted easily? Here again, the answer seems to be no. Both 
lexical and syntactic ambiguity lead to increased complexity for the hearer. 
Additional computation must be undertaken in order to select the correct 
interpretation of a number of possibilities. Movement also causes difficulties for 
comprehension, because resolving filler-gap dependencies can be costly, 
especially when they are not signaled in advance (Gibson 1998, Wagers 2008).  
 Is it then language acquisition that drives the system to be optimal? Are 
comprehension and production complicated because the crucial consideration is 
that the system must be easily learnable? Here again, the answer appears to be 
no. Ambiguity (both lexical and syntactic), extra-grammatical idioms, and 
movement, for example, all complicate acquisition, because one–to–one mapping 
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between signal and meaning is upset, because rules of the grammar are not 
consistently followed, and because filler-gap relations must be mastered. 
 Could language be optimal because it is stored in the brain in the most 
efficient manner possible? Again, probably not: Morphological irregularity and 
idioms belie this criterion too. Storage is inefficient in cases where each entry in a 
verbal paradigm constitutes a separate entry. With idiomatic expressions, the 
number of entries in the lexicon grows even further. 
 A fifth criterion suggests that language might be considered optimal if 
communication between speaker and hearer were as efficient as possible. Yet 
again, this criterion can be discounted when we consider ambiguity. Both lexical 
and syntactic ambiguity can lead to communication breakdown, and the 
subsequent need for speakers to make corrections or amendments. 
 Another possible measure of optimality might be in terms of the amount of 
code that needs to be transmitted between speaker and hearer for a given 
message that is to be transmitted. It is not obvious how to explicitly measure this, 
given the complexities of human communication (what counts as the message 
that it is to be transmitted), but this proposal too seems to run headlong into the 
sort of imperfections seen above (ambiguity, movement, redundancy, etc.). 
 It turns out, then, there is — despite numerous proposals — no obvious 
desideratum by which language can plausibly be said to be optimal. 
 A true devotee of the notion of language as optimal solution could of 
course turn to combinations of criteria, for example, could language be a system 
that yields an optimal balance between ease of comprehension and ease of 
acquisition? It is possible, but here too we are skeptical. With no a priori 
commitment to which combinations might be optimized, and no specific account 
for why some of these criteria but not others might be optimized, the advocate of 
linguistic optimality risks getting mired in a considerable thicket of post hoc 
justification. It is easy to see in broad outline how natural selection might have 
favored a system that rewards each of these properties, but there is little 
predictive power; there is no reason from these as first principles, for example, to 
predict that natural languages would (or would not) have locality conditions. 
Formal languages lack them, they complicate acquisition, and inasmuch as extra 
entities such as bounded nodes need to be computed, they presumably also 
complicate comprehension. Imperfections such as morphological redundancy 
could be seen as optimizing ease of comprehension, but imperfections like 
syntactic ambiguity and movement operations do the opposite; imperfections 
like syncretism and lexical ambiguity arguably reduce demands on long-term 
memory (inasmuch as they demand a smaller number of lexical entries) but 
considerably complicate comprehension, and deviate from a kind of elegant one-
to-one mapping principle that is found in formal languages. Taken together, the 
five criteria yield a very weak stew; there is no clear prediction from first prin-
ciples of what a language should be like, only (see Table 1) a set of inconsistent 
and largely post hoc attributions, with no genuine explanatory force. 
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Quirk of language 
 
Consequences 
 
Alleged optimization 
lexical ambiguity complicates comprehension; 
complicates acquisition 
reduces number of lexical 
entries 
syntactic ambiguity complicates comprehension; 
complicates acquisition 
reduces number of 
constructions 
morphological 
irregularity 
reduces storage efficiency   
extra-grammatical 
idioms 
complicates comprehension; 
complicates acquisition; 
reduces storage efficiency 
increases creativity 
morphological 
redundancy 
complicates production simplifies 
comprehension; 
simplifies acquisition 
movement complicates comprehension; 
complicates acquisition 
fits more naturally with 
information structure 
locality conditions complicates comprehension; 
complicates acquisition 
 
Table 1:  Quirks of language and the lack of optimization in language  
 
 In reality some quirks of language may have more to do with history than 
optimal function (Marcus 2008). Our susceptibility to tongue-twisters, for 
example, may come from the evolutionary inertia (Goldstein et al. 2007, Marcus 
2008) inherent in repurposing an ill-suited timing system to the purposes of 
speech production, rather than any intrinsic virtues. Similarly, locality conditions 
may exist as an accommodation to an underlying memory substrate that is 
poorly suited to language (Marcus, in press) rather than as a solution that could 
be considered optimal from any design-theoretic criteria. 
 
 
5. The Minimalist Program and Perfectionism 
 
Talk of language and its apparent imperfections takes on special significance in 
light of its role in the formulation of one linguistic theory that has been 
prominent in recent years — the Minimalist Program, as introduced by Chomsky 
(1995). Here, a presumption of linguistic perfection (or near-perfection) is central, 
with Chomsky (2004: 385) suggesting that language may come close “to what 
some super-engineer would construct, given the conditions that the language 
faculty must satisfy”. Roberts (2000: 851) has gone so far as to suggest the 
Minimalist Program’s assumption that language is a computationally perfect 
system for creating mappings between signal and meaning “arguably 
represent[s] a potential paradigm shift” in Generative Grammar.  
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5.1. Vagueness  
 
5.1.1. Optimality versus Perfection 
 
The first issue is that the difference between optimality and perfection is never 
clarified in the minimalist literature. At the end of the 1990s, Chomsky (1998: 119) 
claims that “language is surprisingly ‘perfect’”. Yet only a few years later, he 
states that “[t]he substantive thesis is that language design may really be optimal 
in some respects, approaching a ‘perfect solution’ to minimal design specifi-
cations” (Chomsky 2002a: 1993), and then, just a page later in the same 
publication, he says that “[t]he strongest minimalist thesis would be this: […] 
Language is an optimal solution to legibility conditions”. Nowhere are perfection 
and optimality teased apart in this literature, yet as was hinted at in section 2, 
these terms should be applied in significantly different cases.  
 
5.1.2. Optimal for What? 
 
Inasmuch as the Minimalist Program is tied to the notion of optimality, it is 
immediately vulnerable to all the concerns outlined in section 3 above, to wit, 
unless there is some clear, a priori criterion for optimality, claims of optimality 
have little force. As Lappin et al. (2000) and Wasow (2002) have noted, Chomsky 
himself is not particularly clear about his criteria. One could imagine that 
minimalism might seek optimality in terms of a linguistic architecture that 
minimized energetic costs, and reduced computational load, but advocates of 
minimalism have never been particularly clear about the criteria.  
 As Lappin et al. (2000) note, if language were optimal in terms of 
computational simplicity, it would require the minimum amount of compu-
tational operations and apparatus; it would not exceed the computational 
requirements of any artificial system that could be created to undertake the same 
job. Given the presence of redundancy, movement, locality conditions, and other 
imperfections discussed above, this possibility seems like a non-starter. 
Computational simplicity is further compromised by the kinds of “economy 
conditions” (see below) assumed in minimalist analyses, which require that all 
possible outputs given the lexical items inputted be computed and compared in 
order to determine the most economic option (Johnson & Lappin 1997).  
 The minimalist position similarly cannot be rescued by appealing to the 
more modest criterion of optimal compromise examined in section 3. No 
compelling reasoning has been presented in the literature to illustrate the 
pertinent criteria for which language is considered optimal, and how the conflict 
between these is reconciled by the properties the linguistic system shows. 
 
5.1.3. Optimality and Economy 
 
In the minimalist literature, optimality (or perfection) seems most often to be 
equated with “economy”, and with the related suggestion that all properties of 
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language might derive from virtual conceptual necessity,5 a term glossed by Boeckx 
(2006: 4) as “the most basic assumptions/axioms everyone has to make when 
they begin to investigate language”.6 
 In one respect, this notion is admirable (if unsurprising): Linguistic theori-
zing, like all scientific theorizing, should be guided by considerations of parsi-
mony. If two theories cover some set of data equally well, but one does it with 
fewer stipulations or fewer parameters, we should, other things being equal, 
choose the “simpler theory”. 
 But researchers under the minimalist umbrella often seem to take 
parsimony a step further, and suggest that independently of the character of the 
linguistic data, a theory with few principles or representational formats is to be 
favored over a theory with more principles or representational formats. For 
example, the Minimalist Program reduces the levels of representation to just two 
— Phonological Form (PF) and Logical Form (LF), arguing that “virtual 
conceptual necessity demands that only those levels that are necessary for 
relating sound/sign and meaning be assumed” (Boeckx 2006: 75) — where 
previous theories also posit Deep Structure (DS) and Surface Structure (SS). In 
our view, such assumptions are risky. To paraphrase Einstein, a theory ought to 
have as few representational formats as possible, but not fewer; the correct 
number of levels of representations could well be one or two, but it could be 
three or four or even ten or twenty; this is simply a matter for empirical 
investigation. For example, research in autosegmental phonology suggests that 
multiple levels (or tiers) of representation are required to account for processes 
such as tone (Goldsmith 1976); one would not want to revert to a single level 
account simply because fewer levels are superficially simpler or more 
economical. 
 A second type of economy lurks behind the first: An assumption that 
linguistic competence is in some significant fashion mediated by something akin 
to energetic costs. Economy of this sort is reflected in the types of economy 
considerations that have been employed since the earliest times of Generative 
                                            
    5 For a critique of the coherence of the very notion of virtual conceptual necessity, see Postal 
(2003). 
    6 Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus about what such assumptions might be. On the 
restrictive side, virtual conceptual necessity might consist of little more than a requirement 
that sound be connected to meaning (Chomsky 1995, Boeckx 2006), with other properties, 
for example, binary branching, derived rather than stipulated as necessities. On the less 
restrictive side, however, even puzzling properties such as “displacement” (movement), 
which hardly seem logically necessary, are also included, as in Boeckx’s (2006: 73) 
suggestion: “Chomsky (1993) remarked that one way of making the minimalist program 
concrete is to start off with the big facts we know about language […]. These are: (i) 
sentences are the basic linguistic units; (ii) sentences are pairings of sounds and meanings; 
(iii) sentences are potentially infinite; (iv) sentences are made up of phrases; (v) the diversity 
of languages are the result of interactions among principles and parameters; (vi) sentences 
exhibit displacement properties […]. Such big facts are, to the best of our understanding, 
essential, unavoidable features of human languages […]. They thus define a domain of 
virtual conceptual necessity”. In our view, this broader formulation considerably weakens 
the explanatory force of virtual conceptual necessity. Although (i)–(iv) seem like plausible 
minimal requirements, (v) and (vi) seem to be empirical observations about human 
language, not logical requirements: hence properties that demand explanation, rather than 
mere stipulation.  
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Grammar (see review in Reuland 2000), as in Chomsky & Halle’s (1968) evalu-
ation procedures for grammars. More recent minimalist versions include locality-
driven constraints such as Shortest Move, where a lexical item can be moved 
from one position in a sentence to another only if there is no other position closer 
to the lexical item that it could move into, and necessity-driven constraints such 
as Last Resort, where a lexical item will be moved from one position to another 
only if no other operation will result in grammaticality (Chomsky 1995). 
Unfortunately, minimalism, as currently practiced, wavers considerably as to 
what is allegedly being economized.  
 Consider, for example, the nature of the Spell-Out operation in later 
versions of minimalism. Spell-Out is the operation that applies once all lexical 
items in a lexical array have been combined through Merge and Move, sending 
the semantic features of these lexical items to LF and the phonological features to 
PF. In those formulations that follow Chomsky’s (2001) Derivation by phase 
architecture, Spell-Out operates not once at the end of a derivation, but multiple 
times throughout it. Under this view, the derivation advances in stages or phases, 
at each phase only a sub-set of the lexical array being visible. Once the items in 
this sub-set have been combined, Spell-Out of this phase takes place. The 
advantage that is put forward for such a system is the decrease in memory 
requirements — the material that must be ‘remembered’ until the point of Spell-
Out is considerably less. Yet, a system that applies Spell-Out only once could be 
argued to be advantageous in that the machinery for applying the operation is 
invoked only once in the derivation. The question then becomes: Is it 
computationally simpler (and hence more optimal) for the Spell-Out operation to 
apply multiple times to small amounts of material, or only once but dealing with 
a larger amount of material? Without a clear answer to this question, references 
to economy become too evanescent to have real force. 
 A second case pertains to the operation of Agree. Agree allows for 
uninterpretable features on lexical items to be checked and removed before Spell-
Out. In earlier versions of the theory (Chomsky 1995), Agree was permitted to 
apply only to elements in a particular local relation to each other — a Specifier–
Head relation. Later, this stipulation was relaxed, allowing Agree to apply more 
freely. An additional rule was then required in order that illicit Agree relations 
could be ruled out (Chomsky 2001). While it might appear intuitively as if 
permitting Agree to apply freely is a simpler, more optimal approach, the 
question is whether the additional c-command rule that must be imposed negates 
this. Is it computationally simpler (and hence more optimal) to apply Agree 
freely and eliminate problem cases with an additional rule, or to restrict Agree 
from the start to applying only in local domains? Once more, the Minimalist 
Program offers nothing in the way of a discriminating measure. 
 Whether the type of economy measures that the Minimalist Program has in 
mind are better defined as perfection or as optimality, we have shown that 
neither is plausible for language. Taking this path leads the Minimalist Program 
into two different kinds of problematic positions, which we will examine in the 
following sections. 
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5.2. Capturing the Facts of Language Leads to Abandoning Perfection 
 
Even if the notion of optimality could be tightened in order to give it more force, 
a more serious problem would remain: So far as we can tell, Minimalist theory 
cannot actually work unless it abandons the core presumption of perfection or 
optimality. Minimalism equates perfection with a type of bareness that derives 
from admitting only what is strictly necessary. But, as Newmeyer (2003: 588) puts 
it, practice rarely if ever meets that target; in his words, “no paper has ever been 
published within the general rubric of the minimalist program that does not 
propose some new UG principle or make some new stipulation about gramma-
tical operations that does not follow from the bare structure of the MP”. In actual 
practice, many of the mechanisms and operations that have been introduced into 
the system appear to be motivated not from virtual conceptual necessity, but 
rather from empirical realities that could not have been anticipated from 
conceptual necessity alone. For example, phases, movement, and constructions 
all seem to require additional machinery, and none have counterparts in formal 
languages. Capturing them seems inevitably to take the theory away from the 
perfection that is its ostensible target. 
 Consider (8a), and its Japanese counterpart in (8b): 
 
(8) a. What did John buy?           English 
 
 b. John-wa    nani-o       kaimasita  ka?    Japanese 
        John-TOP  what-ACC  buy        Q 
        ‘What did John buy?’ 
 
What would be the simplest and most elegant way to capture the cross-linguistic 
facts illustrated in (8a) and (8b) within a minimalist framework? One option 
might be to say that English question words appear sentence-initially, whereas 
Japanese question words appear in situ in a position further to the right. This is a 
simple, economical, minimalist account. However, it misses the fact that although 
‘what’ appears in initial position syntactically, semantically, it belongs in final 
position, and therefore there is more in common between English and Japanese 
than initially appears the case. However, to account for this fact, the theory has to 
add machinery, and so the account we get is no longer simple, economical or, 
minimalist. 
 Indeed, Kinsella (2009) has gone so far as to argue that EPP features have 
been added to the minimalist architecture specifically to drive movement, and for 
no other reason; there is (once again) no analog in formal languages, and no 
obvious reason that they should exist, for example, following from virtual 
conceptual necessity. As Chomsky (2000: 12) notes, “[i]n a perfectly designed 
language, each feature would be semantic or phonetic, not merely a device to 
create a position or to facilitate computation”. EPP features, however, represent 
exactly that — features which create a position (the specifier position of the head 
holding the [EPP] feature), and which facilitate computation (by forcing a 
movement operation to apply). It is this essential tension which pushes the 
minimalist architecture away from the evolutionarily implausible ideal of 
202 A.R. Kinsella & G.F. Marcus 
 
economy and elegance. 
 One seems to be left, in short, with a choice between (i) a theory which 
delineates an optimal system of language, but that fails to account for the data, 
and (ii) a theory which accounts for the data of human language, but delineates a 
system which is not optimal. Operations such as Move, features such as [EPP], 
and computations such as the generation of multiple derivations from one lexical 
array, to then be chosen between (such as is required in Chomsky 2001), do not 
belong in a bare minimal system, yet seem like concessions the Minimalist 
Program must introduce in order to account for the facts. 
 
5.3. The Redistribution of Labor 
 
More broadly speaking, many minimalist analyses seem to achieve elegance only 
in Pyrrhic fashion, through a redistribution of labor that keeps syntax lean but at 
the expense of other systems, the burden of explanation shifted to phonology, 
semantics, and the lexicon, but the overall level of complexity much the same as 
before. 
 The phonological component of the grammar, for example, now looks after 
optional movements, such as Heavy NP Shift, topicalization, extraposition, and 
the movements required to deal with free word order languages. Also removed 
to this component of the grammar are the more obligatory movements of object 
shift and head movement, as in, for example, verb second languages. As a 
strongly lexicalist theory of language, the minimalist lexicon takes over the work 
required to deal with wh-movement, and case assignment, in the form of 
uninterpretable features. The binding of pronouns and anaphora is in at least 
some minimalist approaches (partly) the responsibility of the semantic compo-
nent (Chomsky 1993, Lebeaux 1998). These redistributions may well be well-
motivated, but simply shifting computations that were once assumed to be 
syntactic to these other components does not make the grammar as a whole any 
more optimal, simple, or perfect. In the limit, if one simply deems syntax to be 
the elegant, non-redundant part of language, the notion of elegance becomes 
tautological, and the notion of syntax itself loses any connection to the very 
linguistic phenomena that a theory of syntax was once intended to explain. 
 As Table 2 makes clear, this general trend is common. Many of the 
canonical issues that were given a strictly syntactic analysis in Government and 
Binding theory are removed to other components of the grammar — semantics, 
discourse, and in particular, phonology, and the lexicon, leaving a more minimal 
syntax, but considerably greater complications elsewhere, and suggesting that 
some degree of complexity that departs from virtual conceptual necessity may be 
inevitable, even if it is redistributed. 
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Problem GB solution MP solution 
Head movement 
(e.g., Verb Second) 
Syntax: movement of a category 
head to another category head 
position, e.g., V to I or C (Haider & 
Prinzhorn 1986, den Besten 1989) 
Phonology: covert movement 
after Spell-Out (Chomsky 2001, 
Boeckx & Stjepanović 2001) 
Object Shift Syntax: DP movement to specifier 
position above VP in an extended 
IP (e.g., AgrOP), licensed by verb 
movement (Holmberg 1986). 
Phonology: movement of object 
specified with a [–Focus] pho-
nological feature to a position 
governed by a [+Focus] element 
(Holmberg 1999) 
Passives Syntax: DP movement from cano-
nical object to canonical subject po-
sition for reasons of Case assign-
ment (Chomsky 1981b) 
Phonology: thematization/ 
extraction rule extracts direct 
object to the left edge of the 
construction (Chomsky 2001) 
Wh-movement Syntax: movement of wh-phrase to 
[Spec,CP], plus parameter deter-
mining level of representation at 
which the specifier of an inter-
rogative CP must be filled (Lasnik 
& Saito 1992) 
Lexicon: [wh]-feature on wh-
phrase and interrogative C for 
checking, plus [EPP]-feature on 
interrogative C in non-wh-in-
situ languages (Chomsky 2001) 
Case Assignment Syntax: assignment operation — 
transitive verbal head assigns 
accusative case to object DP under 
government, inflectional head 
assigns nominative case to subject 
DP in Spec–Head relation 
(Chomsky 1981b) 
Lexicon: uninterpretable formal 
case features are checked via 
agreement of φ-features 
(Chomsky 2001) 
Binding of pronouns 
& anaphors 
Syntax: Binding Conditions A and 
B (Chomsky 1980) 
Semantics: Binding Conditions 
A and B (Chomsky 1993), 
Binding Condition A (Lebeaux 
1998) 
Table 2:  Shifting burdens of explanation and the Minimalist Program 
 
 
6. The Reality of Imperfection and its Implications for Linguistic Theory 
 
If the analyses given above are correct, it is unrealistic to expect language to be a 
perfect or near-perfect solution to the problem of mapping sound and meaning, 
and equally unrealistic to expect that all of language’s properties can be derived 
straightforwardly from virtual conceptual necessity. The sorts of optimality-, 
economy-, and parsimony-driven constraints that advocates of minimalism have 
emphasised may well play an important role in constraining the nature of 
language, but if our position is correct, there is likely to be a residue that cannot 
be derived purely from such a priori constraints. 
 
6.1. Beyond Virtual Conceptual Necessity 
 
Two of the most salient forms of this residue — characteristic properties of 
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human languages that do not seem to follow from virtual conceptual necessity — 
are idioms and the existence of parametric variation between languages that 
cannot be boiled down to simple differences in word order (Broekhuis & Dekkers 
2000).  
 Consider first idiomatic expressions, such as kick the bucket, keep tabs on, 
extra-grammatical examples of the sort discussed in section 3.1.3, and the many 
constructional idioms and partially-filled constructions discussed by Culicover & 
Jackendoff (2005) (e.g., to VERB one’s BODY PART off/out, giving us He sang his 
heart out, He yelled his head off, He worked his butt off, etc.). In the first instance, the 
very existence of such phenomena does not accord well with minimalist 
principles: Formal languages, which generally lack idioms, are more economical, 
more parsimonious, and more elegant. One might ultimately craft a minimalist 
account of idioms, but it is hard to see how to do so without stretching one’s 
notion of conceptual necessity.  
 Many seemingly straightforward patches to the Minimalist Program either 
fail or undermine the overall goals of minimalism. For example, one might 
suggest that the compositional operation of Merge could apply to units larger 
than individual words, but as Jackendoff (to appear) notes, on this proposal, 
partially-filled cases such as ‘take X to task’ are problematic. If Merge were to 
target the whole unit directly from the lexicon, it would need to be categorized as 
a verb rather than a verb phrase (phrases must be created by merging smaller 
units together), but it is not clear how or why a verb would be allowed to have an 
open argument position within it, and how this argument position would be 
filled given that Merge cannot target parts of an undecomposable unit. 
Alternatively, along the lines of Rögnvaldsson (1993), one might allow syntactic 
composition rules to operate in the lexicon, but although this might account for 
cases with an idiosyncratic semantics only, it leaves those cases which also have 
an idiosyncratic syntax, such as be that as it may, unexplained. Yet another 
possibility, along the lines of Svenonius (2005), might be to account for idioms in 
terms of more complex tree structures (Banyan trees) and movement to a position 
that is part of some unconnected structure (sideward movement, Nunes 1995), 
but this seems to be a clear case of adding machinery beyond what is 
conceptually necessary in order to account for the data.7 8 
 Certain cross-linguistic variation, too, poses difficulties for theories that 
vest heavily in economy. Consider, for instance, the question of whether a 
language requires a phonologically overt subject (e.g., English) or not (e.g., 
Spanish), or of whether in a given language the verb comes before its object (e.g., 
English) or after (e.g., Japanese). In earlier theories, these questions were 
answered by appealing to the notion of parameters set during acquisition.  
                                            
    7 Banishing idioms to the ‘periphery’ rather than the ‘core’ does not really help. It may well be 
that idioms somehow sit outside the regular form-meaning mapping rules of the language, 
but the fact remains that idioms are pervasive in human languages (Jackendoff, to appear), 
and that they are absent in formal languages; as such, their existence in human language 
must be explained.  
    8  Even in approaches that treat idioms in much the same way as non-idiomatic constructions 
(e.g., Distributed Morphology, Halle & Marantz 1993), complexity lingers, for example, in 
the form of a post-syntactic idiosyncratic meaning component.  
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 Although that explanation still seems reasonable to the present authors, 
parameters of this sort actually pose difficulties for any orthodox version of 
minimalism. Take for example the original definition of the pro-drop parameter 
(Rizzi 1986), according to which the person and number features of the 
phonologically null subject are determined by the verb it occurs with. While this 
conjecture is quite reasonable, it poses difficulty for minimalist approaches, in 
which the person and number features of a verb are determined by the subject of 
that verb, in an Agree relation. In particular, on minimalist accounts, the null 
subject is licensed by the agreement features of the verb, inherently it cannot be 
specified with agreement features, but the verb’s agreement features must be 
given their value by the null subject. To fix this, additional machinery of some 
form must be added to the minimalist architecture. One possibility (Alexiadou & 
Anagnostopoulou 1998) is to stipulate that agreement features are already valued 
on the verb in languages which allow phonologically empty subjects. This, 
however, requires stipulating that the distribution of such features differs cross-
linguistically, and undermines the idea that a verb is not intrinsically singular or 
plural, 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person (Kinsella 2009). A second option is to say that null 
subjects possess the agreement features required to give value to the verb’s 
features (Holmberg 2005). This, on the other hand, requires stipulating that the 
null subject has its identity already, suggesting that the lexicon must contain 
multiple null subject entries, and taking the null pronoun very far from its 
original characterization (Kinsella 2009). 
 The word order effects that the head directionality parameter gives rise to 
can be accounted for in the Minimalist Program in one of three ways, but each 
adds complexity to the system. The first says that the Merge operation which 
combines lexical items into larger structures is subject to a condition deciding 
which element of the pair being combined will determine the category of the 
combined unit (as a simplified example, if a verb and a noun combine, will the 
unit they form be a verb phrase or a noun phrase?); cf. Saito & Fukui (1998). The 
second posits a rule in the phonological component of the grammar which looks 
after the linear order of words, rearranging any orderings which are not 
permitted in the language in question. This, of course, is simply the type of 
redistribution of labor (from syntax to phonology) discussed in section 5.3. The 
third possibility (Kayne 1994) assumes a universal underlying order and invokes 
movement in the syntactic component, thus requiring additional features to be 
added in order to drive movement in languages whose surface order differs from 
the underlying order. 
 If the restrictions that the Minimalist Program places on language were to 
be relaxed, better analyses for idioms, or for parametric variation, might be 
possible. Instead of beginning with the assumption that the system should be 
optimal, economic and simple, and having to then add to the syntactic machinery 
in unconvincing and arbitrary ways in order to account for particular facts, it 
would surely be preferable to admit complexity from the outset and account for 
the data using rules, operations, and generalizations that apply across the system 
as a whole. Indeed, alternative frameworks for theorizing about language, which 
do not place perfection and economy at their core, offer more convincing 
accounts for these cases.  
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 For example, idioms might be more naturally captured by construction-
based approaches to language (e.g., Goldberg 1995, Kay & Fillmore 1999, 
Culicover & Jackendoff 2005) that posit a continuum of form-meaning mappings 
(constructions), where individual lexical items sit at the idiosyncratic end of the 
continuum, and general phrase structure rules, such as VP → V NP, sit at the 
general end, idioms sitting somewhere in the middle. Hardly elegant (and such 
theories have their own problems, Crain et al. 2009), but perhaps demanded by 
the empirical data. The redundancy of lexical storage that emerges from such a 
position would only be possible in a framework that accepts the existence of 
imperfection. 
 Optimality Theory, meanwhile, might lend insights into parametric 
variation. An optimality-theoretic take on the pro-drop parameter invokes the 
constraint of SUBJECT (which stipulates that a sentence must have an overt 
subject), which will be ranked high in languages like English, but will be out-
ranked by many other conflicting constraints in languages like Spanish. This 
competition between constraints is seen clearly in the explanation for the 
existence of semantically empty subjects in languages which require an overt 
subject. The constraint of FULL-INT (which stipulates that all elements in a 
sentence must have meaning, i.e. expletive elements like ‘it’ and ‘there’ are ruled 
out) is in direct competition with the constraint of SUBJECT (Grimshaw & 
Samek–Lodovici 1998). In null-subject languages, FULL-INT is ranked higher 
than SUBJECT, that is, SUBJECT can be violated in order to satisfy FULL-INT. 
These languages, unlike English, disallow overt expletive elements; the reverse 
ranking of these two constraints would result in an overt expletive as we get in 
English. 
 
(9) a. Piove.            Italian 
          rains 
  ‘It rains.’ 
 b.     * Il piove.            Italian 
            it rains 
  ‘It rains.’ 
 c. *(It) is raining.          English 
 
 This alternative approach neatly captures the facts as a result of relaxing 
the demands of perfection and economy. It posits multiple constraints where a 
more parsimonious system might prefer to posit just one, and it allows (even 
demands) that these constraints compete, without demanding that a single one-
size solution should optimally fit all.  
 More broadly, the fact that languages vary is not per se predicted by virtual 
conceptual necessity — one could easily imagine some species having sound-
meaning mappings but having only a single grammar. Likewise, it seems 
unlikely that one would a priori expect that there would be significant arbitrary 
variation within a given language; constructed languages do not typically 
contain irregularities, idioms, and the like. Such variation — within languages 
and between languages — is characteristic of human language, and indeed 
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among the properties that most markedly differentiate human languages from 
other formal languages. To put this somewhat differently, if linguistics is to 
capture what is characteristic of human language, it cannot simply provide a 
kind of Platonistic conception of what ideal languages would be, it has to 
describe — and ultimately explain — the character that human languages 
actually have. 
 
6.2. A Recipe for (Bio)linguistics 
 
The recognition that there are possible sources of imperfection in language must 
be reflected in how the language theorist goes about his day-to-day work. 
Moving forward, we suggest that the following principles should be followed: 
 
(A) Economy cannot be presumed. Although economy may 
contribute to the nature of language, one should not add 
features or operations to the system merely in order to achieve 
economy at a higher level of explanation.  
 
(B) One should not assume a priori that every property of 
language is rule-based. Individually stored examples may 
oppose the clean simplicity of a  system that is entirely rule-
based, but experimental evidence shows that the most 
parsimonious account may sometimes be a more complicated 
one (Pinker 1991, Prasada & Pinker 1993, Marcus et al. 1995).  
 
(C) One should not presume a priori that there is an absence of 
redundancy. A framework which is compatible with the 
existence of this imperfection may actually be more correct than 
one that is not compatible with it. 
 
 Biolinguistics is characterized by Boeckx & Grohmann (2007) in the 
editorial of the inaugural issue of this journal as an interdisciplinary enterprise 
concerned with the biological foundations of language. In order to fulfill this 
mission, biolinguists must take seriously insights from other disciplines. If our 
argument here is correct, at least one strand of recent linguistics — its tendency 
towards a presumption of perfection — is at odds with two core facts: The fact 
that language evolved quite recently (relative to most other aspects of biology) 
and the fact that even with long periods of time, biological solutions are not 
always maximally elegant or efficient. To our minds, anyway, the presumption of 
perfection in language seems unwarranted and implausible; a more realistic 
theory of language may reverse this trend, and look towards possible 
imperfections as a source of insight into the evolution and structure of natural 
language. 
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